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BAR BRIEFS
LAW BOOKS FOR SALE
Corpus Juris, Vols. 1 to 72 inclusive; Annotations, 1921 to
1941 inclusive; Northwestern Reporter, Vols. 1 to 296 inclusive.
Address inquiries to Mrs. Kathryn L. Brainard, Dickinson, N. D.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In The State of North Dakota, ex rel Alvin C. Strutz, as Attorney
General of the State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Berta E. Baker,
State Auditor of the State of North Dakota, and John Gray, State Tax Com-
missioner of the State of North Dakota, Defts., and John Gray, State Tax
Commissioner of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Applt.
That under the constitution of this state the people have reserved to
themselves the power of initiating legislation and no such measure enacted
by a vote of the electors "shall be repealed or amended by the legislature,
except upon a yea and nay vote upon roll call of two thirds of all the mem-
bers elected to each house." Section 25 of the Constitution as amended.
That where the legislature amends and re-enacts such an initiate4
measure, the "initiative" character of the measure is not destroyed, but re-
mains in force, and any subsequent amendment of the initiated measure or
of an amended or re-enacted portion thereof is subject to the constitutional
limitation placed upon the legislature.
That Chapter 195 of the Session Laws of 1941, known as "Motor Vehicle
Fuel Tax Act of 1941" is an attempted amendment of a measure initiated and
enacted by the people; and not having received the prescribed two-thirds vote
of each house, was not adopted constitutionally, and, therefore, is not a law
of this State. Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. R. G.
McFarland, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
Morris and Burke, JJ. concur specially.
In Standard Oil Company of Indiana, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt, vs.
State Tax Commissioner of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Applt.
That Federal excise taxes on sales of gasoline (48 Stat. 764, 26 U. S. C. A.
Sec. 2412) paid by the purchaser to the seller for payment by the latter to the
Federal Government, do not constitute part of the sales price, or "gross re-
ceipts" of sales within the purview of the State sales tax law. (Laws 1939,
Ch. 234; Laws 1937, Ch. 249).
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. F. Jansonlus,
J. The State Tax Commissioner appeals from an order of the District Court
setting aside an 'order of the State Tax Commissioner.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt., vs.
R. L. Wright, as County Treasurer of Williams County, North Dakota, Deft.
and Applt.
That personal property taxes extended against real estate pursuant to
the provisions of chapter 242, sessions Laws, N. D. 1929, become a lien on
such real estate as of the date of the extension and entry thereof.
That the lien of personal property taxes extended against real estate Is
inferior, subsequent and subject to a mortgage placed of record against said
real estate prior to the entry of the personal property tax lien.
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That a county treasurer, after the date of the entry of a personal prop-
erty tax lien against real estate, is without authority to accept payment of
taxes on the real estate against which such entry has been made without
making collection of the personal property tax lien.
That the priority of a mortgage lien is not affected by the statute re-
quiring the county treasurer to make collection of extended personal prop-
erty taxes at the time real estate taxes are paid.
That extended personal property taxes paid by the holder of a prior
mortgage on the real estate may be recovered if paid under proper protest.
That taxes paid under protest may be recovered under the provisions
and upon the conditions prescribed by chapter 286, session laws N. D. 1931.
That the complaint in this case is examined and it is held to set forth
facts constituting a cause of action for the recovery of extended personal
property taxes paid under protest by the holder of a prior real estate
mortgage. Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Hon. John
C. Lowe, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opnion of the Court by Morris, J.
In Jalmer B. Stafney, Pltf. and Respt. vs. Standard Oil Company, a
corporation, and R. H. Dodd, Defts. and Applts.
That the occasion and circumstances under which a communication
said to be libellous is made determine whether such publication is privileged.
That a communication required to be made, and made In a proceeding-
authorized by law, is a privileged communication.
That where such privileged communication is made to a department of
the state in the discharge of a duty under express requirement of law,
such communication, if pertinent to the issue, is absolutely privileged.
That an absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which,
by reason of the occasion-, upon which it is made, no remedy can be had
in a civil action of libel.
That in the case of such an absolutely privileged communication, no
one may inquire as to whether the utterer was actuated by malice.
That where the occasion and the attending circumstances under which
such communication is made are not in dispute, the question of whether
the communication is absolutely privileged is for the court to determine.
That a communication made by an employer to the Unemployment
Compensation Division of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau of this
State, under the provisions of Chapter 232 of the Session Laws of 1937
requiring an employer to make out and deliver to the Bureau and to a dis-
charged employee a statement required by the Bureau, showing the dis-
charge of said employee and the reason therefor, is an absolutely privileged
communication when made in the manner and form required by law, and
can not be made the basis of any action for libel.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Hon. M. J.
Englert, Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In V. R. Middlemas, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Alvin C. Strutz, as Attorney
General of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Respt.
That in order to constitute a game of chance, which is played for a
consideration, a lottery under the provision of Section 9660 Compiled Laws
of North Dakota 1913 and Section 9674al Supplement to Compiled Laws
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of North Dakota the prize or award which a player may win must be
property or an interest in property.
That the definition of personal property contained in the penal code
(sec. 10369 C. L. 1913) is sufficiently broad to include every statutory defini-
tion of personal property.
That the exclusive right to operate an amusement device is property.
That the playing of an amusement device, commonly called a pin ball
machine which is played for a consideration and which offers to the player
an opportunity, dependent chiefly upon chance, to win the right to the
extended free use of the device for periods of varying duration, is a lottery.
(Compiled Laws of North Dakota, Section 9660).
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonius,
Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J., Christianson, J. dissents.
In Sax Motor Company, a corporation, Pltf. and Respt.vs. Paul Mann,
Deft. and Applt.
That in claim and delivery proceedings, plaintiff must depend upon
the strength of his own title.
That it is error to grant a motion to set aside a verdict and to enter
judgment notwithstanding the verdict unless it clearly appears from the
whole record that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Hon. H. L Berry, Judge.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In Erna Janssen Pltf. and Applt., vs. J. A. Kohler, Sheriff in and for
Burleigh County, North Dakota, et al Deft. and Respt.
That where evidence is properly admissible for a limited purpose, al-
though not admissible upon other issues in the case, it is not error to receive
it.
That where exemplary damages are demanded and the motives upon
which defendants acted are at issue, any evidence bearing upon motive,
including the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the information
upon which the defendants acted is properly admissible.
That where plaintiff offers herself as a witness, that is to be deemed
a consent to the examination of her attorney upon the same subject. (Sec.
7924 C. L 1913).
That where one party's witness is allowed to refer to a memorandum for
the purpose of refreshing his recollection while testifying and no foundation
Is laid to make the memorandum competent for any other purpose, and
where the memorandum is not offered by the adverse party, It is not error
to exclude it from evidence.
That It is for the jury to determine the weight which shall be given
to the uncontradicted testimony of a party to an action where there is in
the case evidence of facts and circumstances which are inconsistent with
its truth.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. 1_ G. Mc-
Farland, Judge.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
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In State of North Dakota Pltf. and Applt., vs. Otto Rasmusson, County
Auditor, Deft. and Respt.
That rights of purchasers of bonds of school districts are subject to
the provisions of statutes in effect at the time of the issuance of the bonds,
relating to detachment of territory from school districts, organization of
new school districts and the equalization of property, funds on hand and
debts between school districts which have been affected by a change in
boundaries.
That where territory is detached from one school district and organized
into a new school district, the tax levies made by the old district for debt
service do not follow the detached territory except insofar as the same may
be relevied by an arbitration board under the provisions of section 1328,
Compiled Laws of 1913.
Appeal from the District Court of Cavalier County, Hon. W. J. Kneeshaw,
Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Applt., vs. H. C. Loy et al, Deft.
and Respt.
That under the provisions of Section 8327, Compiled Laws of 1913, a
"question of the title to real property in fee or for life" may not be sub-
mitted to arbitration.
That where, in an action to quiet title the parties submit to arbitration
the only question upon which issue is joined and a decision upon that ques-
tion is determinative of title to real property, the submission is one of a
question of title to real property and void.
Appeal from the District Court of Mercer County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller,
Judge. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In Helen G. Mutschler, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That the record is examined and it is held, that plaintiff is entitled to
share in the compensation fund administered by the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau of this state.
AFFIRMED. Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County, North
Dakota. Hon. R. G. McFarland, Judge.
In Northwestern Mortgage & Security Company, and Providence Wash-
ington Insurance Co., Pltfs. Applts., vs. Noel Construction Company, a
domestic corporation, and Dr. J. A. Carter, Defts. and Respts.
That chapter 174, laws 1935 which provides "that the use and operation
by a nonresident or his agent of a motor vehicle upon and over the high-
ways of the State * * shall be deemed an appointment by such nonresident
of the Commissioner of Insurance of the State * * to be his true and lawful
attorney upon whom may be served all legal processes in any action or
proceeding against him growing out of such use or operation of a motor
vehicle over the highways of the state, resulting in damages or loss to
person or property." applies only in actions or proceedings against a non-
resident. It has no application in an action or proceeding growing out of
the use or operation of a motor vehicle over and upon the highways of this
state resulting in damage or loss to person or property, where, at the time
the loss or damage is alleged to have been sustained, the owner and operator
of the motor vehicle had his legal residence or domicil in this state.
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That a domicil once existing cannot be lost by mere abandonment even
when coupled with the intent to acquire a new one, but continues until a
new one Is in fact gained.
That a person having his legal residence or domicil in this state, who
removes from the place of his domicil with the intention not to reside there
any longer and to remove to another state, is still a resident of, and has
his domicil in, this state as long as he remains in the state. His domicil in
this state continues until he acquires another domicil elsewhere.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. P. G. Swenson,
Judge. Plaintiffs appeal from an order setting aside the service of summons
upon the defendant, Dr. J. A. Carter.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, Judge.
In Hilda Stelter, Respt., vs. Northern Pacific Ry. Company, et al., AppIts.
That questions of negligence and contributory negligence are questions
of fact for the jury unless the evidence is such that but one conclusion can
be reasonably drawn therefrom.
That if the evidence concerning contributory negligence is such that but
one inference can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, the matter pre-
sents a question of law to be decided by the court.
That the evidence is examined and it is held that the plaintiff's negli-
gence contributed proximately to her injury.
That where the negligence of two parties proximately contributes to the
injury of one of the parties, the one who has the last clear chance to avoid
the injury is considered solely responsible for It.
That in order for an injured party to successfully invoke the doctrine
of the last clear chance, it must appear that the party against whom recov-
ery is sought could have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable care.
Appeal from the District Court of Grant County. Berry, J. REVERSED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J.
